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transfers 8& 
Although this pro-patent policy may 
make a good deal of sense for some 
government-sponsored discoveries, there 
are reasons to suspect that it makes little 
sense for others. In our eagerness to 
avoid the inadequacies of the public- 
domain approach, we may have moved 
too quickly and too emphatically in the 
opposite direction, to the point that 
patent rights in some government- 
sponsored discoveries may actually be 
undermining, rather than supporting, 
incentives to develop new products and 
bring them to market. 
It is time to re-evaluate the role of 
patents in technology transfer - on the 
basis of more than a decade of actual 
# This article was Si FEDERAL POLICY SINCE 1980 has reflected 
adapted from 
remarks presented to 
an increasingly confident presumption 
that patenting discoveries made in the 
course of government-sponsored research 
is the most effective way to promote 
technology transfer and commercial 
development of those discoveries in the 
private sector. Policymakers in the past 
may have thought that the best way to 
the Congressional 
Biomedical Research 
Caucus in 
Washington, D.C., 
June 28,1993. 
- 4 - .  Reprinted with achieve widespread use of government- 
permission- from sponsored research was to make the 
the J O U ~  of results freely available to the public; the 
NIH Research, new pro-patent policy stresses the need 
Val, 5,  No. 10, for exclusive rights as an incentive for 
October 1993. industry to invest in bringing new 
products to market. 
experience rather than uncorroborated 
fears - and consider how the present 
sjrstem might be improved. 
Laws call for patents 
In 1980, Congress passed the 
Stevenson-Wydler Innovation Act, which 
made technology transfer an integral part 
of the research and development respon- 
slbili~ies of federal laboratories and their 
employees, and the Bayh-Dole Act, which 
reversed the prior practice of some 
agencies of retaining publlc ownership of 
dlscoverles made through federal re- 
search funding in universltles and small 
businesses Later legislative enactments 
and executive orders have broadened the 
provisions of Bayh-Dole and Stevenson- 
Wydler Acts and closed loopholes that 
lnigt~t have left potentially valuable 
discoveries unpatented 
Under the system we have In place 
today, whether federally-sponsored 
inven~lons are made in government, 
university, or private laboratones, if  
anyone involved in the research project 
wants the discovery to be patented, 
chances are i t  wlll be patented Thus, for 
example, ~f a government agency or 
university has no Interest in pursuing 
patent rlghts m a discovery, the mdl- 
mdual investigator who made the 
d~scovery may step in and clalm them 
Now, all of this makes a good deal of 
sense if  we want all government-spon- 
sored research dlscovenes to be patented 
Sut do we? 
One slgn of trouble in paradise for 
lederal technology transfer policy is the 
reactlon of industry trade groups when 
the National Institutes of Health filed 
patent applications m 1991 on thousands 
of  randomly selected partial complemen- 
tary DNA (cDNA) sequences of unknown 
function This sequence lnformat~on was 
discovered In an NIH laboratory as part 
of the Human Genome Project, a govern- 
ment-sponsored effort to map and 
sequence all of the DNA in the human 
chromosomes 
Position statements from the Pharma- 
ceutlcal Manufacturers Association 
(PMA) and from two biotechnology trade 
groups that have slnce merged, the 
Industrial Biotechnology Association NIH Director Harold Varmus explained 
(IBA) and the Association of Biotechnol- that seeking these patents was not in the 
ogy Companies (ABC), contradicted the best interest of science or the public. 
hypothesis that government patents on Varmus said that input from Professor 
these cDNA sequences are necessary to Elsenberg, who served on a panel 
protect the interests of firms that might convened to advise him on this issue, 
develop related products in the future. heavily influenced his decision.] It may 
PMA and IBA both urged that NIH not be that under current law NIH had little 
seek patent protection on cDNA se- choice but to pursue patent rights itself 
quences of unknown biologcal function. or leave them to the inventor, even 
ABC supported the NIH decision to seek though later product development would 
patent protection, but only as a means of probably be better served by leaving the 
generating revenues for the government. DNA sequence information in the public 
Indeed, even ABC urged that the patents domain. This suggests at the very least 
be licensed on a nonexclusive basis so as that federal agencies ought to have more 
not to block development projects in flexibility to determine that some 
industry. inventions would be better left in the 
These trade groups are not composed public domain. 
of naive, idealistic scientists who have 
limited experience with patents and Do patents help? 
limited interest in product development. But how can an agency determine 
Their members are the same hard-nosed, when patent protection is likely to 
profit-maximizing firms that Congress is facilitate technology transfer and product 
trylng to entice into developing products development and when it is likely to 
Out of government-sponsored inventions interfere with those processes? The logic 
through its patent policy. Their reactions of the pro-patent stratear itself suggests 
to the cDNA patent applications alone are certain limitations, The argument for 
enough to call into question the strong patenting research discoveries as a means 
pro-patent tilt of the NIH policy. of promoting their later development into 
[Editor's note: In February, the NIH useful products is this: patents permit the 
reversed its policy and withdrew patent fimls that invest in product development 
applications for the cDNA partial to reap the rewards of their investment 
sequences. In announcing this decision, through commercially effecdve monopo- 
lies. Patents are most likely to perform 
this function when they cover an end 
product that is sold to consumers. 
PATENTS HAVE A CRITICAL 
ROLE T O  PLAY IN 
PROMOTING TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER. BUT THE 
INCENTIVES CREATED BY 
PATENT RIGHTS IN 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED 
INVENTIONS W O U L D  DO 
LllTLE T O  COMPENSATE FOR 
THE DAMAGE W E  COULD DO 
T O  OUR RESEARCH 
ENTERPRISE IF W E  ALLOCATE 
T O O  MUCH O F  OUR N E W  
KNOWLEDGE T O  PRIVATE 
OWNERS A N D  T O O  LllTLE 
T O  THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.  
Somewhat less effective are process 
patents covering a specific use of an 
unpatented product. The trouble with 
these so-called use patents is that as long 
as there are other uses for the product 
that are not covered by the patent, the 
patent holder cannot stop competitors 
from selling the unpatented product itself 
and thereby driving down its price. If the 
product is available from a variety of 
sources, it may be impossible to monitor 
what purchasers are using it for. 
Another even less effective type of 
patent covers starting materials or 
processes used in making an unpatented 
end product. Such patents do not 
prevent a competitor from making the 
product from different materials or 
througha different process, or even from 
using the patented materials overseas and 
then importing the end product into the 
United States. Such a patent may also be 
difficult to enforce because of the practi- 
cal problems involved in detecting and 
proving infringement in the manufactur- 
ing process. 
Weaker still, as a device to keep 
competitors out of the market, is a patent 
covering products or processes that are 
used only during product development. 
Not only is it difficult to detect and prove 
infringement of such a patent, but often 
the only effective remedy will be mon- 
etary damages because an injunction 
against future use of the invention will 
not thwart the efforts of a competitor 
who has already finished using it. 
For these reasons, firms that are 
interested in developing end products for 
sale to consumers are unlikely to see 
patents on research tools as a very 
effective means of protecting their market 
exclusivity. Such patents may generate 
royalty income, and that prospect may 
make it profitable to develop further 
research tools in the private sector, 
but patents are unlikely to enhance the 
incentives of firms to develop end 
products through the use of those 
research tools. 
On the other hand, one firm's research 
tool may be another firm's end product. 
This is particularly so in the contempo- 
rary biotechnology industry, in which 
research is big business, and there is 
money be made by developing and 
marketing research tools for use by other 
firms. 
Thus, even as the trade groups were 
calling on NIH to dedicate its cDNA 
sequence information to the public, new 
firms were forming to do further cDNA 
sequencing in the private sector, presum- 
ably with the hope of obtaining their own 
patent rights. It may well make sense to 
have this particular task performed in the 
private sector, and patents may enhance 
the incentives of firms to step in and do 
it. On the other hand, it may make more 
sense to leave this information in the 
public domain, even if that means that 
the government has to continue to bear 
the cost of generating it. 
Potential harm to research 
There are reasons to be wary of 
patents on research tools. Competing 
firms may hesitate to request licenses for 
fear of revealing the directions of their 
own research. Moreover, a large research 
project might require access to a great 
many research tools; if each of these tools 
requires a separate license and royalty 
payment, the costs and administrative 
burden could mount quickly. Another 
danger is that a company might refuse to 
make a patented research tool available LO 
competitors at any price. Or, patent 
holders might find it more lucrative to 
license research-tool patents on an 
42 THE U N J V E R S I ~  OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL 
csciusive rather than a nonexclusive 
hnsis, thus choking off the research and 
clt.\.elopment of other firms. 
Basic research activities might also be 
~ffecred. For years, this country has 
sustained a flourishing biomedical 
research enterprise, in which investiga- 
tors have drawn heavily on discoveries 
that their predecessors left in the public 
domain. Even if exclusive rights enhance 
private incentives to develop further 
rcsearch tools, they could do significant 
harm to the overall research enterprise by 
inh~biting the effective use of existing 
ones. 
Research tools may therefore be one 
esample of the sort of discovery for 
which esclusive rights do more harm 
than good. There are undoubtedly others 
as well. Certain fundamental inventions 
~ i t h  a wide range of applications may be 
more effectively exploited if left in the 
public domain or otherwise made freely 
available to all than if patented and 
licensed on an exclusive basis. For 
example, the absence of patent protection 
on fundamental techniques for producing 
hybridomas and monoclonal antibodies 
does not seem to have significantly 
retarded the development and patenting 
of commercial products using those 
technologies. 
Time to analyze impact 
The time is ripe to take a critical look 
at the actual operation of our technology- 
transfer policy over the past decade and 
see how well it is working. This task calls 
for more than an examination of aggre- 
gate statistics on the percentage of 
patented inventions that have been 
licensed. I t  would be useful to know 
whether those inventions have led to the 
development of commercial products, 
and whether those products are protected 
by other patents that would provide a 
comparable degree of market exclusivity 
even i f  the government-sponsored 
invention had been left in the public 
domain. I t  would be useful to know what 
effect those patents have had on the 
research and development of the 
licensee's competitors, or on other firms 
that failed in their bids for exclusive 
licenses. 
The rhetoric surrounding federal 
technology-transfer policy suggests that 
whatever is good for industry must be in 
the public interest. This is a vast over- 
simplification of a complex issue. The 
private sector responds to the profit 
incentives created by whatever policies 
the government puts in place. Whenever 
the government offers new property 
rights, one would expect someone to step 
forward to claim them. It  doesn't neces- 
sarily follow that those property rights 
are, on balance, creating new social value 
that will make all of us better off. 
Patents have a critical role to play in 
promoting technology transfer. But the 
incentives created by patent rights in 
government-sponsored inventions would 
do little to compensate for the damage 
we could do to our research enterprise if 
we allocate too much of our newr knowl- 
edge to private owners and too little to 
the public domain. Government is 
uniquely situated to enrich our public 
domain. We should be wary of disabling 
the government from performing this 
critical function in our eagerness to 
enhance private incenthTes to put existing 
discoveries to use. 
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